The President, God, and Progress

Comment/Ghana Developmen

Let’s go into the mind of President John Atta Mills, a PHD in law, and envision with him his infatuation with God.

In this imaginary Ghana, there are no ethnic problems, no sanitation plight and no vehicular accidents. Poverty is wiped out. God would be in such control that nobody would blame witchcraft, evil spirits or demons for their existential tribulations. Ghanaians would have enviable life expectancies.  There would be no infant or maternal mortalities. There is wonderful human security. Ghanaians are highly educated and all have the same income. There is perfect gender equality. Every Ghanaian eats well, drink and bath with very clean water. There will be no diseases to worry Ghanaians. All Ghanaians sleep well and have deep peace of mind.

Ghana would stop to be on the 130th position of the 169 countries ranked by the United Nation’s Human Development Index that measures human well-being globally. Ghana would have the highest development indicators in the world.

President of Ghana, John Atta Mills

On and on it goes. Dr. Atta Mills’ God-ruled Ghana would pile up dazzling development indicators for Ghanaians. All the earlier post-colonial African development impediments such as the state being in some sort of dystopian wasteland of Idi Amin’s barbarism or Jerry Rawlings’ incomprehensible moral disaster or Murmmar Gaddafi’s frightening utopian Green Book planet will be no more. Democracy, the rule of law, social justice, freedoms, equality, good governance, prosperity, liberty: all are closer reality.

The point in looking at Dr. Atta Mills God-possessed mind isn’t to poke fun at him. Or at least, it isn’t triviality. Aside from Dr. Atta Mills’s fascination with God, to the point of sometimes infuriating Ghana’s development game, there is not much that’s unusual in this vivid exercise in the Dr. Atta Mills God-mania futurology.

In his almost two-and-half years since becoming President, Dr. Atta Mills practically tops all Ghanaian Heads of State in his obsession with God. Behind this climate is Dr. Atta Mills mired in prophets of all stripes. The Ghanaian political chatting class is constantly abuzz with all kinds of gossip about Dr. Atta Mills and his dalliance with prophets in the seat of government, the Osu Castle.

The attention-seeking Nigeria prophet, Temitope Balogun (TB) Joshua, founder of the highly rated The Synagogue, Church of All Nations, appears to have entrapped Dr. Atta Mills spiritually. TB Joshua is alleged to have prophesized that Dr. Atta Mills would be President of Ghana during the 2008 presidential election. Superstitiously, Dr. Atta Mills visited TB Joshua before the 2008 presidential elections in Lagos, Nigeria. Prophet TB Joshua is a vastly noted man of God in Dr. Atta Mills’ God cosmos.

Like Grigori Rasputin, the Russian mystic who had immense influence on the Russian Emperor Nicholas 11, TB Joshua has comprehensively powerful sway over Dr. Atta Mills. No doubt, as democracy help Ghanaians to exercise their freedoms and thinking, Dr. Atta Mills’ fixations with God and prophets have become popular mass media and social media talks and jokes.

The general views from the commentators are that with his PHD in law, as long time professor of law at the University of Ghana, as an administrator with some academic publications, and with his lovingly mature age of 65, Dr. Atta Mills is expected to glow with soaring rationality within the context of the irrationalities hindering Ghanaians’ advancement. Some Ghanaians are convinced that Dr. Atta Mills is rationally fragile, has weak grasp of Ghana, is basically unrealistic, and have feeble sense of God’s place in Ghana’s progress.

In his campaigns for the presidency, Dr. Atta Mills not only borrowed from US President Barack Obama’s “change” mantra but also fixed his campaign pictures beside Obama’s. The end of story. And the beginning of the search for the actual Obama in Dr. Atta Mills.  Though far older than Obama (who just turned 50) and with Obama stuck in the dense development issues left by his predecessors that have let him grow gray hair in just two-and-half years as he struggles to solve the problems, critics of Dr. Atta Mills’ too-much-God-talks think he should talk very rationally, realistically, deeply and plausibly like Obama in the context of Ghana’s development struggles.

Obama is very religious but he doesn’t waste all his time exasperatingly and illogically on God when tackling thorny development matters in the difficult United States political climate. Obama’s God-given cerebral powers are constantly at display as he confronts the United States’ development challenges. Ghanaians are yet to see this broadly in Dr. Atta Mills.

Nevertheless, over time Dr. Atta Mills’ God-issues have become nauseating. His latest God-this-God-that was at Fetu Afahye festival in Cape Coast, the capital of Ghana’s Central Region, where traditional oracles, shrines, mosques and churches of all character compete for spiritual prominence in the atmosphere of fear of witchcraft, demons, evil spirits and malevolent forces. In Cape Coast, Dr. Atta Mills told superstitiously gullible Ghanaians “it was God who set up kings and therefore the next President for the country lay in the hands of the Almighty God.”

There is nothing wrong in Dr. Atta Mills saying this in a culture that has strong belief in God. After all, the basis of most progress begins with deep spiritual practices. The American thinker Francis Fukuyama indicates in The End of History and The Last Man that the root of Western progress cannot be fully discussed without its spiritual origin. But the spirituality has to be unambiguous and not entangled in false believes in prophets, juju-marabou mediums, witchcraft, demons, evil spirits, supernatural beings and malevolent forces.

Such traditional spiritually unhelpful entanglements have impacted unconstructively on Ghana’s real progress. The community in the northern part of Ghana that believes in God but also believes in witchcraft and left a baby named Mercy to die in a room simply because they believe (wrongly) that she is a witch, is in need of a Dr. Atta Mills who will simultaneously talk God and talk rationalization of believes in witchcraft within the Ghanaian culture so as to save the life and the human rights of baby Mercy and her community from such destructive thinking. In the Dr. Atta Mills’ presidency, the God talk hasn’t been equal to the rational talk in the Ghanaian development actuality.

In the authentic Ghana, as the impending 2012 general elections looms, there may be God in the affairs of Ghanaians but the next President, come 2012, will be elected based entirely on the exercises of Ghanaians’ God-given rational faculties that are expected to help them rationalize issues, policies and programmes of either President Atta Mills’ ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) or the main opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP) or the minority Convention People’s Party (CPP).

God surely will not physically get involved in the 2011 general elections: God will rather let Ghanaians weigh the contending personal merits, issues, policies and programmes presented by the political parties to vote the next President and Members of Parliament of Ghana.

The simple truth about Dr. Atta Mills in the past two-and-half years is that his awkward God-obsession has been met with a good number of Ghanaians increasingly pressurizing him to emit systematic reasoning in tackling the development challenges facing them. And not the quixotically God-will-solve-the-development-problems (some very dire) ways of thinking.

If you like this article, I’d recommend my book “If I Was Famous, I’d Have a Lot to Say”

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The Twisted African Democratic Revolutions

Special Feature/African Democracy                 

Either in Libya, Nigeria, Chad, Egypt or Tunisia, the African nation-state, from its birth, has been in some sort of undeviating inanimate democratic revolution. The reason is that the African state, as a political entity, is yet to have everlasting grip with the African nation, as a community, hence the almost constant schisms and the revolutions. African revolutions occur not because of the African community, which is intact, but the African state, which is unbalanced and unreflective of Africans’ innate democratic feelings.

Upheavals against colonialism for independence aside, post-colonial Africa’s bad leadership, endemic corruption, poor governance, horrific tyrants and dictatorships, and generally unstable domestic authority structures have put African states in almost permanent revolutions for democratic order. Hard questions abound as to when the revolutions will end and democratic institutions set up.

As I witnessed as a teenager during the 1979 Rawlings revolution, revolution can bring momentary joy to a people who are depressed from bad political leadership and economic shortages. Ghana witnessed this under the Kutu Acheampong military junta, which also described itself as revolutionary. Doug Saunders, of the Toronto-based The Globe And Mail, writing about world revolutions following the Egyptian, Libyan and the Tunisian revolutions, explains that, “The joy of revolutions is that they make ordinary life interesting. Suddenly, the streets glow with importance; anything seems possible.”  Under such atmosphere, the state, of which the revolution is about, fades into the background momentarily.

In either Jerry Rawlings’ Ghana or Idi Amin’s Uganda or Samuel Doe’s Liberia, almost all the African revolutions share the basic belief that life will be better for the average African. Against these beliefs is the fact that not all the African revolutions are the same, coming in diverse contours.

While the Idi Amin revolution saw him turn Uganda into a primitive enclave with roughly constant chaos and Uganda later saved by the amalgam of Julius Nyerere’s Tanzanian army and Ugandan freedom fighters, Mobutu Sese Seko effectively destroyed the traditional institutions (by deeper meaning, the soul of the country) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and left the DRC virtually soulless with almost continuous cataclysms, especially in the eastern and northeastern parts.

Experts explain that what ring constantly in revolutions are the human possibility, that what was previously thought of as unimaginable becomes imaginable, that what was thought of as rotten could be overthrown and something fresh could be sown. Doug Saunders inferred of revolutionary traditions globally that, “Even when” revolutions are “sidetracked or seized, the seeds planted by a democratic revolution remain in the ground.”

The African who has gone through revolutions will tell you that their revolutions have turn out to be mostly disappointments than contentment. However, as Ghanaians and Nigerians will tell you today, out of this disenchantments are emerging democratic order from the democratic seeds planted by the various democratic revolutions. Jeff Goodwin, a sociologist at New York University, discussing the nature of revolutions following the Libyan, Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, is quoted by Joe O’Connor, of the Toronto-based National Post, as saying revolutions “ … are a complex genus with different species.”

The insurgent-ridden African Great Lakes Region aside, Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) is a typical African case of revolution that went mad. But out of its ashes democracy and good governance are flowering in Sierra Leone. The RUF revolution against the rots of the long-running Siaka Stevens’ autocratic one-party system, later carried on by Joseph Saidu Momoh, turned out to be exceptionally fatal. The RUF amputated Sierra Leoneans limbs, turned girls into prostitutes, looted diamonds, fire-bombed properties, practiced cannibalism, and frequently carved the initials “RUF” on their child soldiers’ chest. RUF officers rubbed cocaine into the open cuts on their troops to make them maniacal and fearless, and for entertainment, some RUF soldiers bet on the sex of an uborn baby and then sliced open a woman’s womb to determine the winner.

Still, and as Samuel Doe’s Liberia revealed, some African revolutions have turned out to be unimaginable, sending the likes of the Liberian or the Ivorian state into flames. Some African revolutions endings are worse than the previous conditions the revolutionaries sought to correct. Jerry Rawlings’ revolution, initially seen by some Africans as “enlightened,” saw the execution of some Ghanaian military junta leaders, mainly for their alleged corruption and moral ineptitude (The Rawlings coup d’etat had more to do with the rot within the military establishment than the Ghanaian society).

But Rawlings’ almost 20 years in power became perverse and saw Rawlings and his associates amassed more wealth than all those they had killed. At present, most of Rawlings and his associates’ children and families live high lives (sometimes bordering on ostentation), attended pricey schools abroad (and still do) and had medical treatment abroad (and still do). In Rawlings’ revolution, perhaps Africa’s most high profile because of the high profile killings, the new reality is that the revolution didn’t live up to its hype. Like most African revolutions, corruption was the Rawlings revolution’s first mission, but his regimes grew up to lack accountability and transparency. The regime also suppressed freedoms that resulted in the famed “culture of silence,” where Ghanaians were afraid to talk freely for fear of either being killed, imprisoned or disappearing.

Nigeria also went through numerous military juntas that hypothetically had sought to revolutionarize the Nigerian society and make life better for Nigerians. Though this did not happen, out of this cycles came enviably anti-corruption institutions such as the amazing Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) set up in 2003 to tackle endemic graft. Despite top flight killings, the Rawlings regimes were sadly short of this.

In the Rawlings’ revolution, Africa witnessed that high-tension sloganeering didn’t translate into reality. Jeff Goodwin, is cited by Joe O’Connor, as explaining that, “Countries generally have revolutions because they are in bad situation, and revolutions don’t always get you out of that hole … Revolutions happening in poor authoritarian countries, well, those countries usually end up remaining poor and authoritarian.”

In Equatorial Guinea, Francisco Macías Nguema revolution of some sorts turned out more lethal than thought of and nobody knew what kind of regime was going to come out of the terrible mess. Tapping into traditional African irrational supernatural believes, Macias forced Equatorial Guineans to believe that he has supernatural powers. That he can change into a cat, a dog, a mouse or any other animal or object, or vanish into thin air. Macias used the knowledge of witchcraft he inherited from his sorcerer father and built a huge collection of human skulls (from most of the people he has killed) at his homestead to hypnotize Equatorial Guineans into supernatural submission. Macias believed he was some sort of God..

In December, 1975, in a bizarre episode Macias killed 150 alleged coup plotters to the sound of a band playing Mary Hopkin’s tune Those Were the Days in the national stadium in Malabo, the capital. The estimations are that over 100,000 people, approximate one-third of Equatorial Guineans then, were either killed or fled into exile during Macias’ reign. In 1979, Macias was overthrown violently by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the current President.  Macias was later executed in a firing squad. The situation today in Equatorial Guinea isn’t more or less better than Macias’ time.

Despite the fact that most African revolutions turn out to be sadness, there are few that are sunnier and bring regime changes. Out of the Valentine Strasser and the Maada Bio revolution came the flowering of democratic tenets and good governance in Sierra Leone born out of the bloodshed of the 11-year civil war. There may be some political and development challenges in Sierra Leone today but the hope is that in the long run, democratic values and good governance will survive for the greater progress of the country.

Helpless African betting on Jerry Rawkings, Samuel Doe, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Lansana Conteh, Sani Abacha, among others, have been the African way of attempting to change the recurring appalling leadership and generally trembling domestic power configurations. Most African revolutionary outcomes have been largely the African elites fighting for political and material power while the average African languishes in poverty and unfreedoms.

For almost 42 years, Libyans had no freedoms and lived in fear. Libyans could be either killed or imprisoned anytime despite Muammar Gaddafi professing that his much-trumpeted revolution is to free Libyans from the tyranny of King.Muhammad Idri 1. Still, notwithstanding The Green Book (that sought solutions to the problems of democracy and economics) and the People’s Committees (that sought to upgrade the authority of the Libyans), Gaddafi and his associates, for 42 years the privileged few, not only dreadfully controlled Libyans but the principles and institutions of government did not become egalitarian – institutions like the police and the military were ruined, making Gaddafi look for mercenaries when the freedom fighters came calling six months ago.

More seriously, Gaddafi and his The Green Book were allergic to liberal democratic ideals. These are insults to the intelligences of contemporary Africans’ on-going fight for democratic revolutions that sought for free press, good governance, freedoms, human rights, social justice, equality, choices, free speech and good governance. In the absence democratic ideals, Gaddafi and other African tyrants are consumed in tyrannies and dictatorships that have put Africa states in almost unending revolutions for democratic order and good governance.

Unlike Rawlings and Lansana Conteh revolutions, the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions show that non-violent social networking, via social media, is becoming the order of the day in Africa’s democratic revolutions. This made tyrants like Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali turn into sand in matter of weeks, with virtually no resistance. Fear or a “culture of silence” vanishes into thin air. Egalitarianism, choices, elections, democratic tenets, good governance, merits and issues replace the God-has-predestined-me-to-rule syndrome.

With their increasing grasp of social media, these are Africans shining age of their democratic revolutions backed by the increasingly influential African diasporan networks. The era of the old school African revolutionaries picking up arms, standing on armour cars and sloganeering, waving AK47s and their fists, and blasting out the African dictatorships are out.

In come non-violent protests and social networking sites such as Facebook, internet forums, web blogs, social blogs and microblogging such as Twitter, collaborative projects such as wikipedia, podcast, content communities such as Youtube, photgraphy or pictures, video, email, instant messaging, rating and social bookmarking are the key tools of today’s African democratic revolutionaries and not AK47s, Kalashnikov, military tanks and hot-headed sloganeering. The “cascading dominoes,” as Joe O’Connor of the Toronto-based National Post argues, “are characteristic of a revolutionary age. Europe went crazy for liberal democracy in 1848, in a tide of mostly fruitless revolutions … And when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, it took communism with it, a mass combustiom of authoritarian governments often miscast as a spontaneous event.”

Despite the instant power of new media, some experts argue that generally revolutions start in simmering ways before erupting. The Liberian revolution came about because of long years of oppression of native Liberians (the “country people,” as they are called locally) by the Americo-Liberians, who believed they are more civilized than the native Liberians. For decades, the native Liberians were oppressed and effectively made second-class citizens on their own land. A triggering moment happened and Samuel Doe and his associates seized the time.

Like most African democratic revolutions, the Liberian revolution wasn’t any specially planned event, it was largely meaningless flare. So the Liberian revolution happened, it didn’t just happen, as Jack Goldstone of George Mason University would have argued, as he did of the nature of revolutions in the world. Samuel Doe and his associates quickly realize its “game on and there is no turning back” in attempting to clare out the autocratic Americo-Liberian oligarchy.

There may be twists in Africa democratic revolutions and experts may argue that it may be easier to know when revolutions start than when they end, but Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Mali and Uganda point to the reality that African democratic revolutions will eventually move into the direction of real democracy and good governance under the current continental and international atmosphere. There are no two ways about this.

If you like this article, I’d recommend my book “If I Was Famous, I’d Have a Lot to Say”

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The International Community and Africa’s Democracy Construct

Commentary/Africa Development

More than ever as Africa gets entwined in the international system, the international community is becoming increasingly part of Africa’s development. Ever more, the international community includes the ever-growing Africans working in numerous international organizations and diasporan Africans across the world’s capitals whose transmission of billions of dollars annually to Africa have given them immense influence on their homelands.

Most times, the international community is the last resort in resolving Africa’s self-inflicted complications, especially in the face of frightening leadership as we saw in Nigeria under Gen. Sani Abacha and his associates. The reasons vary Africa-wide, but the constantly ringing arguments are feeble political leadership and weak institutions. Against these backgrounds, international pressure to democratize for stability and development are impacted on African countries where threats of coup d’etats, weak economies, fragile underdeveloped infrastructure, and unstable domestic authority structures are strongly prominent.

As Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi reveal under such dire conditions sovereignty is eroded and Africans hopelessly suffer, gapping for mortal help in the face deadly unstable domestic authority structures. Under such condition, as the American thinker Francis Fukuyama argues in State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, “sovereignty and therefore legitimacy could no longer be automatically conferred on the de facto power holder in a country. State sovereignty was a fiction or bag joke in the case of countries like Somalia, which has descended into rule by warlords.”

In such situations, the “international community,” as Francis Fukuyama contends, “ceased to be an abstraction and took on palpable presence as the effective government of the country in question.”

When ex-Cote d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power after loosing the November, 2010 presidential elections, the international community, sensing more deaths and destruction of properties, helped not only remove Laurent Gbagbo from power but before that cut-off the Gbagbo regime from all Ivorian funds and diplomatic relations, sending his diplomats abroad packing.

The same treatment was rendered to Niger when the military took over power from President Mamadou Tandja. On April 7, 2011, Mahamadou Issoufou, of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-Tarayya), became President after successful multiparty elections.

Tied to foreign aid, international investments and diplomatic influence, as democratic Ghana and Botswana show and are enjoying, the  idea is linked to the international community’s policy of “democracy promotion” in the world. This is part of the international community’s   international development architecture. As Nigeria’s elections show, initially elections may not be free and fair, but overtime it becomes better. The April16, 2011 elections in Nigeria was better than the one in 2007.

Whether dealing with African civil wars, post-conflict countries, coup d’etats, post-elections crisis, or political instability, distressed Africans point to the international community for decisive help as countries in Africa’s Great Lake Region show. The assistance is made more critical because of the fact that most African countries depend on international donors for their budget sustenance.

However, increasingly, the African diasporan financial remittances are matching up with foreign financial aids. But the problem with the African diasporan remittances is that it is not organized as a force for political reforms but individuals sending money to families. Sometimes, diasporan groups lobby international institutions and foreign governments for certain actions against definite African situations when need arises.  This makes their collective force on African issues, superlatively, frail. So the real force to help change difficult African issues such as building democracy for greater development, rest, in the final analysis, on the international community’s assistance.

But the international community could be a problem in the democratization of Africa. Patricia Daley, a human geographer at Oxford University, argues that what happens in Africa’s democratization process is that if African elites sorely take hold of the democratic process without fully bringing African traditional institutions on board, the elites, mimicking the West, allow the international development community to commandeer the democratic process, who usually do not understand the African sensibilities, and with their lack of control and dearth of knowledge, mess up the democratic process.

Regardless of this, the international community becomes the last card in helping build democracies in Africa. Latest research by political scientists Hein Goemans (of University of Rochester) and Nikolay Marinov (of Yale University) about post-coup d’etats African countries, under immense pressure to survive, is most likely to transit to democratic practices as soon as possible. The successful stories of Sierra Leone and Liberia demonstrate the investigations by Goemans and Marinov.

Entitled “Putsch for Democracy: The International Community and Elections After the Coup,” Goemans and Marinov point out, using most of their data from African coup d’etats and elections, that before 1991 majority of successful African coups installed their leaders in power. The picture changes dramatically between 1991 and 2001 – with most African coup d’etats leading to competitive elections, in five years or less. Niger, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Conakry come to mind. In this sense, Post-Cold War Africa has progressively seen conflict-ridden African states under immense pressure by the international community to democratize through timely competitive elections. Goemans and Marinov characterize this as the “electoral norm.”

In Sierra Leone, rumour had it that military junta Head of State, Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio, despite promises to hold competitive elections after Sierra Leone’s 11-year-old civil war had thought privately of reneging and transforming himself into civilian President, as Ghana’s Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings did. But unrelenting international pressure, in addition to the diasporan Sierra Leonean lobby, forced Gen. Bio to hold on to his public pledge.

The result was Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, winning the presidential elections and becoming President in March 29, 1996 – May 25, 1997 and March 10, 1998 – September 17, 2007. For this, post-conflict Sierra Leone is profoundly donor-dependent and over 60 percent of its national budget  comes from the international community. In total Sierra Leone receives over US$300m annually in international aid.

Most African countries that depend heavily on international development aid are easily the first to go for competitive elections, after coup d’etat, civil war or political crisis. Goemans and Marinov hypothesis is that since 1990s there have been decline in illegal seizure of power in Africa. In this context, the current African political picture is that coup d’etats (which normally lead to civil wars and political instabilities) is the most important case for toppling African democracies.

Goemans and Marinov explains that their “ … findings indicate that the new generation of coups have been considerably less nefarious for democracy than their historical predecessors.” What is striking in Goemans and Marinov supposition is that “outside pressure” has surely engendered “electoral norms,” that have dissuaded “coup-entrepreneurs.”

One of the success stories of the “electoral norms” is Sierra Leone. Dubbed Britain’s sore “successful humanitarian intervention,” Sierra Leone continues to be held up by former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, as proof of the success of the “new doctrine of international community” he introduced in 1999. With threats of coup d’etat, weak economy, brittle underdeveloped infrastructure, and unbalanced domestic power structures, the only development card for post-conflict Sierra Leone to play was with the “new doctrine of international community.”

In its struggle to play well with the doctrine of the international community, today, Sierra Leone is one of the fast growing democracies in Africa. Formerly at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index that measures human well-being, Sierra Leone has risen dramatically to the 158th rank out of 167 countries ranked in 2010.

Whether dealing with coup-entrepreneurs, post-conflict actors/groups or political volatilities, the international community, through its famed unrelenting pressure and provision of critical financial aid, has forced various out-of-place African actors/groups to ensure that key institutions of the African state, as Errol Mendes, a constitutional and international law expert at the University of Ottawa, Canada, explains, “are subject to the rule of law and respect the fundamental rights … This means focusing on the imperative of an independent judiciary, a free media, an independent election commission, security forces cleansed as much as possible, and ensuring that forces do not terrorize the people.”

The ability to nurture these democratic tenets in Africa, as Oxford University’s Patricia Daley argues, is how to deal with limitations the international community finds itself in grasping the nuances of traditional Africa values, that are supposed to be lubricant for authentic democratization of Africa.

International pressure or not, significant financial support or not, Ghana, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Nigeria, among others, exhibit that democracy has to be a homegrown enterprise, with the citizens acknowledging its mammoth attributes to their ultimate progress. In this logic, Goemans and Marinov divulge that “democratic norms have a far better chance of taking root in a country if some minimum procedural trappings of democratic government can be maintained over time.”

This makes the delicate work of democracy building and the fostering of development in Africa by the international community sometimes convoluted. In Africa today, as Goemans and Marinov’s research discloses, coup-entrepreneurs, post-conflict actors/groups or perpetuators of political volatilities really “care about the attitude of the international community.” Conversely, the international community as well cares about “the dangers of irregular transfer of power” in Africa.

As an advancement undertaking, as Kofi Abrefa Busia, the late Prime Minister of Ghana and a democracy philosopher, enthused in The Prospects For Democracy in Africa, this makes democracy building in Africa a deeply faithful enterprise that should be driven by Africans’ traditional values. A realistic venture that should be informed by the African facts of fear of coup d’etats, weak economies, fragile underdeveloped infrastructure, and wobbly domestic authority configuration.

If you like this article, I’d recommend my book “If I Was Famous, I’d Have a Lot to Say”

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West Africa’s Democratic Evolution – African or Western?

Special Commentary/West Africa

For sometime, the centre of Africa’s anarchic one-party systems, gory tyrants, brutal dictatorships, self-serving military juntas and hideous civil wars, West Africa is changing and indisputably sowing democratic seeds. Whether in Cape Verde, Liberia, Guinea-Conakry, Niger, Nigeria or Guinea Bissau multi-party elections are blowing across the once politically sick region.

The only black sheep today is Senegal’s Casamance conflict, which is still on-going. But as West Africa’s democracy deepens, the Casamance conflict can surely be solved with democratic ideals, as the Liberian, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leonean cases show. Continue reading “West Africa’s Democratic Evolution – African or Western?”

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Botswana in the Mind of Ghana

Commentary/Ghana/Botswana

The August 17 meeting between Ghana’s President John Atta Mills and Botswana’s Ian Khama goes between the normal symbolic bilateral sweet talks. In contemporary African thinking, the core issue between Ghana and Botswana is how their respective democracies are harbingers of progress for the entire African democratic and development growth.

Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama of Botswana (left) and President John Evans Atta Mills of Ghana (right)

The Botswana-Ghana meeting also comes at a time when development economists are changing their focus away from cross-country empirical studies towards case studies and “analytic narratives.” “Instead of trying to explain all of sub-Saharan Africa’s problems in one grand sweep, economists are engaging in more focused studies of particular nations.  Their hope is that by clearly understanding the particulars, broader conclusions can be drawn,” explains Scott A. Beaulier, an economist at Troy University, USA.

The two countries democracies are trendsetters in Africa but Botswana is the better of the two. While Ghana, a coastal nation, is loud-mouthed, Botswana, landlocked, is quiet and much more levelheaded.  Botswana is a top African example of how democracy, of the African extraction, can be used to solve most of Africa’s complicated development challenges.

Botswana’s development indicators top Sub-Sahara African countries. This is despite the fact that 84 percent of Botswana’s land mass is largely the uninhabitable Kalahari Desert and 80 percent of Botswana’s people live along the fertile eastern stripe of the state. Like Israel, the future is how Botswana transforms its inhabitable Kalahari Desert into habitable land for greater development.

Since independence in 1966 from Britain, Botswana, unlike Ghana which gain independence from Britain in 1957, has consistently held unfettered multi-party democratic elections, Ghana hasn’t, maked by military coups and executions. Like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Botswana was blessed with a fine founding President, Sir Seretse Khama, devoid of Nkrumah’s egomaniac tendencies. But unlike Ghana where Nkrumah later became a dictator and Ghana over the years expereinced some bad leaderships, Botswana is blessed with three decent leaders who succedded Seretse, the present one being Ian, the son of Seretse.

Unlike Ghana, Botswana, from 1966, driven by immense wisdom, has been able to integrate its traditional institions into its British colonial heritage in its development process. Seretse’s wife was a British woman, making Ian, like ex-Ghana President Jerry Rawlings, half-cast.. This makes Botswana indigenous institutions and values central part of its democracy, with its indigenous institutions as key accountability watcher. For instance, despite his immense political power, the traditional chief is regarded as an equal to Botswana people.

As Newsweek pointed out in 1990 in a piece entitled “Longing for Liberty,” “Botswana built a working democracy on an aboriginal tradition of local gatherings called kgotlas that resemble New England town meetings.” That explains not only Botswana’s democratic evolution but its dececentralization exercises that flow from its traditional values.

Botswana has an abundance of diamonds and successive governments have brilliantly husbanded it wisely for proper development of Botswanans. Ghana was formerly the world’s number one cocoa producer (it is now in number two), long-running political instabilities affected its development. Botswana doesn’t have such problems and coupled with its good governance, this has made Botswana Sub-Sahara Africa’s best developed and best run country. In the UN Human Development Index, Botswana ranks 98th and Ghana  130th out of 169 countries ranked in 2010.

In either Ghana or Botswana, world slumps in cocoa or diamonds, respectively, has affected Gross Domestic Product over the years. In Botswana, the average income has tripled in real terms in two decades, putting Botswana on a par with Mexico. While average income of a Ghanaian is 1.60 Ghanaian cedis (0.74) a day, in Botswana it is 3.8 Botswana pula (1.94) an hour for most full-time labor in the private sector.

At the same time as Ghana’s population is over 24 million and heavily heterogeneous and Botswana’s is 2 million and is almost homogenous, at issue aren’t size but the quality of governance. Size or no size, Botswana virtually escaped what most African countries have to confront – how to contain a far headier concoction of disparaging ethnic groups within boundaries unrealistically drawn by ignorant colonial map-makers. Ethnically, Botswana’s foremost test is how to deal with its anti-modern Bushmen minority. Ghana has tribalism problems, with some of its 56 ethnic groups as backward as the anti-modern Bushmen.

Unlike Ghana’s highly competitive democracy, Botswana leaders are yet to be challenged by a strong opposition; a single party has ruled since independence in 1966. That makes Botswana almost a one-party system. That is one reason why it was Ghana, with only 19 years of democratic practices, a recent African success story in democratic development, that made analysts to argue for US President Barack Obama to make his first visit to a sub-Saharan African country. Ghana’s 2008 presidential elections was neck-to-neck and the then governing National Patriotic Party (NPP) maturely accepted defeat by the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) at the polls.

However, in Ghana and Botswana democracy is fairly well established and independent institutions just evolving (Botswana has fairly  better developed democratic institutions than Ghana). In Botswana, the   Botswana People Party has been in power for 44 years. The opposition parties, especially the main Botswana Movement for Democracy, are widely considered to have no real chance of gaining power.

On the other hand, in Ghana, political power has been changing hands between the ruling National Democratic Congress and the main opposition National Patiotic Party. But in Botswana voters happily vote the ruling Botswana People’s Party into power for the past 44 years. Yet Botswanans do not feel disenfranchised. Despite this, over the years, Botswana has proved as an example of good governance in Africa. The lesson from Botswana isn’t how often political power changes hands but how political power is used for good governance and development.

Despite some democratic hurdles in both Botswana and Ghana, the African experiences points to democracy and political leadership, more of the Botswanan variety, where African values are deliberately and proportionally mixed with the Western liberal ones, as the best strategy to solve most of Africa’s development challenges.

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Bumps, But Africa’s Democracy Rises

After much misunderstanding, with all the anarchic one-party ordeals and self-serving dictatorial military juntas, it appears Africa is nearing a turning point in its democratic grasp. There may be divergent signs, some incredibly disturbing as Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic indicate, but it looks like a turning to democracy as the best option to solve Africa’s development challenges. This is Africans new trust, for cultural, historical, moral and material reasons, in resolving decades of political mix-ups, contradicting irrational international exuberance and governance deficits, in relation to Continue reading “Bumps, But Africa’s Democracy Rises”

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Africa and the Culture Question

As progress act, Africans are questioning their culture in terms of their advancement. The strategic issue of culture in Africa’s progress is gaining momentum. In Ghana, the culture-progress debate has given birth to an enlightenment movement.

The Ghanaian mass media aside, the prestigious Ghana Academy of Arts and Science has joined the enlightenment movement and has organized training sessions for journalists to deal with cultural inhibitions that stifle progress. By this action, the Academy is playing its role as the intellectual conscience of society and is supposed to project high rationality and credibility. In this sense, Ghanaians looked up to the Academy to illuminate the darkness that emanates from within their culture that has been entangling their progress.

Holistically, at issue aren’t only tackling the cultural inhibitions but also appropriating the enabling aspects of the Ghanaian culture for policy-making and progress. The Academy is yet to openly pressure Ghanaian bureaucrats and policy-makers to appropriate Ghanaians’ culture for policy development. This should be a deliberate and organized effort. The Academy is also thinking of floating a Science Reporting Award for journalists in order to whip up their enthusiasm to tackle the acute relationship between science, culture and advancement as part of the enlightenment movement.

In this sense, as Kingwa Kamencu, president of the Oxford University Africa Society, said, borrowing from the late Burkina Faso Head of State, Thomas Sankara, the Ghana enlightenment movement is daring to invent the African future for a new generation of Africans.

By their activities, the Ghana enlightenment movement has brought out how cultural inhibitions generate powerlessness and deprivation and the movement is attempting to empower and free Ghanaians to overcome their widespread cultural irrationalities. The trick is using the enlightenment campaigns to empower Ghanaians by minimising inhibitions within their culture that have been blocking their greater progress. That the cultural inhibitions have made Ghanaians/Africans powerless and unfree is unassailable.

These positive attempts will make Ghanaians “active citizens” freed from the clutches of certain cultural inhibitions. In the foreword to From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens And Effective States Can Change the World (2008) by Duncan Green, the famous Indian economist Amartya Sen argues that this state of active citizenry “can be a very effective way of seeking and securing solutions to these pervasive problems of powerlessness and unfreedom.”

As the Ghana Enlightenment spreads Africa-wide, the Nigerian Dare Akinyemi ponders the culture question in relation to Nigerians’/Africans’ progress. Dare Akinyemi asked in a short philosophical piece at the Nigerian owned US-based africanoutlookonline.com, “How come Africans/Nigerians have not been able to use their cultures to elevate Africa/Nigeria to the global economic stage? Could it be that their cultures have no relevance to economic development or this is an area that has not been explored and need to be explored?”

Africans’ culture has huge significance in their advancement! And the exploration has began in Ghana, where the enlightenment movement is playing with the culture as progress act. If Dare Akinyemi takes time to reflect on his Nigerian/African culture and its impact on progress, he will come to the agonizing conclusion that it is characterized by a disintegration of thought processes by African elites and leaders who are yet to have thorough grasp of their culture as directors of progress.

The elites know more about foreign development paradigms than their own African ones. The result is palpable confusion in the development game.

This makes the issue of Africa’s culture in relation to its progress, at best, an intellectual schizophrenia. African policy-makers and leaders, over 50 years after colonial rule, have not embraced their culture as strategic policy-making ingredient. So whether in law, society, ethnic cohesions, management, justice, structure, design, or meaning, the African culture, as the foundational psychological thrust of Africans, isn’t projected enthusiastically as a positive development mechanism.

The South Africans will readily tell their fellow Africans that their traditional value of ubuntu, “I am because we are,” which is also found in the over 2000 African ethnic groups, can easily be appropriated as management material, just as the Japanese have been able to develop management systems called Kaizen from within their cultural values that have been part of their remarkable successes.

As Ghana’s Y.K. Amoako, the former UN Economic Commission for Africa chair indicates, Africa is the only region in the world where foreign development paradigms dominate its development process to the detriment of its rich cultural norms. This makes the African confused, demeaned and at the mercy of foreign development values. More than ever as the Southeast Asians such as the Chinese and Indians enter Africa for raw materials, Africans can borrow from their culture-progress thinkers and tap into how they were able to mix their culture with that of the Western world for their respective prosperity.

Yes, culture as an economic development issue is still complicated, largely unexplored area. Gregory Clark, economic historian at the University of California, Davis, and author of A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, argues that “… attempts to introduce culture into economic discussions so far have been generally either ad hoc, vacuous, blatantly false, or void of testability.”

Gregory Clark has a point to some extent, especially so the complications of the issue of culture in progress. The human progress has been how to undo complications such as culture along the path to progress. In Africa, part of the complications is that most development models are created to fit Western cultural context and not the African cultural context, as Emily Chamlee-Wright, an economist at Beloit College, Wisconsin, argues in a paper entitled Indigenous African Institutions and Economic Development (The Cato Journal, 1993).

The outcome is majority of Africans cut off from the formal development sector such as the banking and other financial institutions. Imagine the implications for authentic progress. The solution, as George Ayittey, of Africa in Chaos (1998) fame, will say, is “African solutions to African problems.” At the heart of George Ayittey’s thinking is “Africa is poor because she is not free.” Part of the unfreedoms emanate from African cultural norms such as the Big Man syndrome (the oppressive African autocrats).

However, at issue here aren’t only using the African culture to thrust economic development but the overall development of Africa in which Africans are freed from certain cultural entanglements that have been stifling their progress. For, the connection between culture and progress can take many formats, as the Ghana Enlightenment movement reveals. Virtually all kinds of Ghanaians from various stations-in-life are discussing the culture-progress issues from their respective experiences, disciplines, and ethnic origins.

But just like the European Enlightenment project, at issue in Africa is culture as an Enlightenment and development fertilizer and, as Ghanaians are doing, how an African Enlightenment project could be used to beam light into Africa’s general development struggles. The attempts aren’t only to unravel the complications of using the African culture to drive progress but how also an African Enlightenment movement could be used to refine the toxics within the African culture that have been inhibiting progress.

In the real Africa, you don’t have to be a qualitative sociologist or anthropologist to know that certain cultural behaviour inhibit progress. Across Africa different ethnic groups exhibit different degree of progress because of certain distinct cultural influences. Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel Prize winner for Economics, in a presentation at the World Bank in July, 2001, borrowing from the German sociologist Max Weber’s ideas of the Protestant Ethic in the successful development of the capitalist industrial economy, asked thoughtfully, “Are there significant influences of cultural traditions and behavioural norms on economic success and achievements?”

Yes. In Ghana, the Asante ethnic group have been compared to the Ewe ethnic group in their respective successes. The Asante are far, far larger in size than the Ewes. Size doesn’t matter here. At issue are traditional values that influence progress. The Asantes is the most prosperous group but the Ewes have relatively high education index and are equally hard working. But while the Asante’s prosperity is as a result of their self-development, the Ewe is the opposite. In fact, Ewe traditional rulers, of recent times, have been demanding that Accra develop Eweland, which is one of the poorest areas in Ghana.

Why? How come the Ewes’ high education index and hard working couldn’t translate into high development indicators in Eweland?  It is certain aspects of their culture behaviour. Investment expects and objective Ewes plausibly argue that the high incidence of the deadly fearsome juju occult is largely responsible for most successful Ewes and other non-Ewe Ghanaians not investing in Eweland. There is fear, mistrust and disloyalty.

Most successful Ewes, afraid of juju, do not go back to develop their homeland but stay put either in Accra or Kumasi. Ewe children born in these cities and other Ghanaian towns exhibit the same mind-set. The columnist Justice Sarpong, of the ghanaweb.com, has intimated that “There are more Ewes living in other regions in Ghana than Ewes living in the Volta region,” their homeland.

In Sierra Leone, where I worked as a young reporter and teacher, I can now reflect, as a mature man, on the Weberian analysis of the role of cultural behaviour on progress among the Fula community. The Fula are traditionally nomadic and pastorialist but over the years have transformed themselves as skilled business people.  The Fula settled in the western area of Sierra Leone over 300 years ago from the Futa Djalon region of Guinea. The Fula’s traces of Weberian Protestant ethic (actually they are non-Protestant and non-Christian community. Most Fula are Muslim), driven more by trust, Islamic practices, patience and loyalty within their community, have seen them over the years owning many of the large shopping centres and businesses in Freetown’s downtown business centre of Kissy Road and Siaka Stevens Street that were traditionally Lebanese businesses enclave.

The Fula are only 5 per cent of the Sierra Leone population but somehow control the commanding heights of the Sierra Leone economy, having gradually edge out the Lebanese who once controlled the Sierra Leone economy.

Still, part of the Fula’s remarkable successes are that there are extremely less witchcraft, demons or evil spirits believes and influences on their behaviour and struggles to progress compare to, say, the Fanti ethnic group of Ghana, whose believe in these irrational forces are very high and have entangled their progress despite having high education index and hard working. Among the Fula, the African development diseases of Pull Him/Her Down and the Big Man syndromes are less compared to other African ethnic groups. The Fanti has one of the highest incidences of the destructive Pull Him/Her Down and the Big Man syndromes in Ghana, as the late Vice Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Prof. Kwesi Andam, himself Fanti, once remarked.

If in 2011 an African university graduate (some with chains of university degrees) still believes that witchcraft is responsible for vehicular accidents or diseases are caused by evil spirits or a “magic ring” can surely make a politician win elections or demons are responsible for people committing crimes (all these backward cultural believes impinge on progress), then the need for questioning certain aspects of the African culture are unassailable truths.

As with Weber’s European Protestant ethic, the Asante and Fula, among other African groups, show nobody progresses with high incidence of deeply negative entangling superstitious believes that undermine the good traits of one’s traditional values.

For broader understanding of cultural behaviour on progress lets look at the Southeast Asians, whom a lot of Africans gleefully admire for their enviable progress. Reflecting on culture and success at his World Bank presentation in 2001 aptly entitled Culture And Development, Amartya Sen argued that, “Infact, in sharp contrast with Max Weber’s analysis of Protestant ethics, many writers in present-day Asia emphasize the role of Confucian ethics in the success of industrial and economic progress in east Asia. Indeed, there have been several different theories seeking explanation of the high performance of east Asian economies in terms of values that are traditional in that region.

“It is interesting to ask whether values really do play such important roles, and if so, how. Are we, for example, seeing in Asia today the consequences of a value system that has some real advantages over traditional Western morals? Have the ancient teachings of Confucius paved the way for great entrepreneurial success in modern times?”

Amartya Sen demonstrates beyond all reasonable doubt how the Japanese have been able to blend their traditional behaviour norms (Confucianism) and businesses. The result is their astonishing economic successes which have transformed their “backward economy into one of the most prosperous nations in the world in less than a century.”

Either in economic backwardness or refining the irrationalities within a culture, in Lawrence Harrison’s intriguing Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture and Save It from Itself (2006), he quoted the American democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan as saying, “The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society … The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself.”

Of concern here are cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes that best promote democracy, social justice, and prosperity. The challenge is how to use the forces that shape cultural change – religion/spirituality, socialization of children, education, and political leadership – to promote democratic tenets for prosperity.

We see this in Ghana through its emerging democracy and healthy press freedoms, where there are attempts to use democratic politics to change the irrationalities emanating from within the Ghanaian culture that have been asphyxiating higher progress. There are attempts too to appropriate the enabling aspects of the culture for policy development. The Ghanaian enlightenment movement is rapidly growing because of the country’s vibrant democracy and mass media that have engendered freedoms, good governance, social justice, equity, human rights and the rule of law.

From Amartya Sen views and other African ethnic groups’ cultural influence on their successes, the Nigerian Dare Akinyemi culture question still haunts Africans as they struggle for authentic development that should flow from within their culture: “How come Africans/Nigerians have not been able to use their cultures to elevate Africa/Nigeria to the global economic stage? Could it be that their cultures have no relevance to economic development or this is an area that has not been explored and need to be explored?”

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Old Leadership, New Leadership

Leadership has become a buzz word for practitioners, bureaucrats and theorists of African development. The term variously means a process of getting work done through people. Leadership may not be science but it is committed responsibility. Africans in civil service, in business schools, in NGOs, in the mass media, in think tanks, in academia, in State Houses, in opposition political parties use leadership as a sort of reality refiner – a way of contrasting past and present, an implement for cataloging out history at a moment of African changes, the flowering of The African Century.
African leadership, being heavily over burdened and scatterbrained, is part of the Old Leadership. For the past 50 years, Africa has been sorting itself up into categories of Old Leadership and New Leadership. We see this in one of Africa’s foremost leaders, Kwame Nkrumah. Prof. A.K.P. Kludze, former Justice of Ghana’s Supreme Court, observes that although President Kwame Nkrumah was a freedom fighter and committed Pan-Africanist, he later succumbed to the Big Man syndrome, turned Ghana into a one-party state and became the life chairman of his ruling Conventions People’s Party and general secretary of the party’s Central Committee. It was considered treason to challenge him. Nobody could stand as a candidate unless his candidature was approved by the General Secretary of the party (read-himself).

The 1960s to the 1990s have become a transforming boundary between one age and another, between a format of things that has crumbled and another that is taking shape. A millennium has come, a celestial divide. Kwame Nkrumah’s era of autocracy of the 20th century is dead; the 21st is a kernel, revealed in continental giant Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan. New Leadership-Old Leadership makes a match of lists: what’s in, what’s out in the African experiences. More imperative, it is a way of considering what works (New Leadership) and what doesn’t work anymore (Old Leadership).

The horrible Central African Republic’s Jean-Bedel Bokassa was the Old Leadership. The New Leadership is what we are seeking for – Liberia’s Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson. One-party system and military juntas are Old Leadership. African communism as seen in Ethiopia’s Menghistu Haile Mariam is Old Leadership. Big one-party systems, military juntas and Jerry Rawlings’ emotionally charged aggressiveness style are dead. Democracy brewed from within African experiences is becoming more and more alive as a development fertilizer. Botswana is one example; Mauritius is another.

With over 45 years in Ghana’s and Africa’s turbulent politics, ex-president John Kofi Kufour is more than qualified to examine Africa’s leadership from very close range. His analysis: “Leadership is key to unravelling the problems of Africa. With the right leadership, good policies would be enacted that will create the right condition for economic growth, respect of the rule of law and the conducive atmosphere for business to thrive,” observed Kufour. Kufour said this in South Africa during the launch of “Why Africa is Poor and What Africans can do about it,” written by Greg Mills, Executive Director of the Brenthurst Foundation of the Oppenheimer and Son Group.

Kufour diagnosed the awful Old Leadership this way: “Africa’s problem was that people assumed leadership positions without being adequately prepared for it and they lacked the vision and drive to pursue policies to the benefit of their people … Studies of individual historic leaders exemplified in the likes of Biblical Moses, among others, would show conclusively that each one of them had come through relevant experiences to be imbued with epochal visions of great and abiding development of their nations … The time when people just jumped into leadership positions should be by-gone. Budding leaders must bide their time and go through the apprenticeship exposures and institutions to better prepare them to assume the rightful role expected of them.”

Old Leaderships: Mobutu Sese Seku, military juntas, one-party and communist systems, Sekou Toure, Mamadou Tandja, the Big Man syndrome, tough talk, imperially threatening attitude (Yaya Jemmeh), arrogance (Idi Amin), centralized bureaucracy and Big government, the leader as a massive juju-marabou dabbler (Samuel Doe), the leader mired in extreme superstitious believes (Marcias Francoise Nguema), the leader under the control of warped spiritualists (Sani Abacha and Bokassa), refurbished ancient paternalism (Siaka Stevens), dictatorship, “God has destined me to be leader” (Jerry Rawlings), heavy cultural inhibitions (all Africa), charisma, tribalistic blood-feud payback, primordial corporate loyalties, Guinea Bissau, and Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (the military politician as the face of the unrepentant African traditional autocracy).

New African Leadership: Humility. God fearing. Deep decentralization so much so that decision-making is pushed down as much as possible to the people affected. Truthfulness. High sense of African history and traditions. Traditional consensus building mixed with modern leadership practices. John Kufour. Evans Atta Mills, Nana Akufo Addo, Ian Khama. Balances. Democratic tenets, human rights, freedoms, social justice, the rule of law. Goodluck Jonathan, Ernest Koroma, Jakaya Kikwete. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States. Television news network, participatory communication, information, facebook, fax machines, tweeter, myspace and other new media. David Mark (the Nigerian soldier greatly democratized). The new Liberia. Pluralism. The new Sierra Leone. Kwasi Pratt Jr. Botswana.

In the African context, Old Leadership is a mixed bag. New Leadership isn’t necessarily the best. There are sham democracies and leaderships – The Gambia and Yaya Jammeh. The New Leadership is an on-going project that needs a lot of socio-political engineering constructed from within Africa’s traditional values, but better than Old Leadership. New Leadership is about output instead of input. The assessment of the New Leadership is what works. It Africanizes Botswana’s leadership skills, the capability to mix the traditional with the modern so as to refine any inhibitions within the traditional.

Old Leadership and New Leadership are often intermingled. Jerry Rawlings and Jacob Zuma as awkward, stalled in stupidity, complete dumbness, are Old Leadership. Foolhardiness is New Leadership, as seen in Central African Republic’s Francois Bozize and the entire leadership of Guinea Bissau, can be different style – small-minded, dishonorable, blank, and uninformed of Africa’s painful past of agony and sadness. New media, the medium of the New Leadership, has an overwhelming addiction to the mediocre that it constantly wrestles with. The New Leadership is a distraction that sometimes reveals simple-mindedness.

In Emilio Mwai Kibaki’s mind, Old Leadership and New Leadership circle each other suspiciously, as Kenya struggles for better leadership and governance. Kibaki is often New Leadership in regional issues but Old Leadership in domestic affairs. Under his watch, Kenya’s 2008 general elections descended into fatal violence and saw over 1,300 people killed and over 300,000 homeless. The International Criminal Court coming into Kenya and planning to put six top Kenyans on trial saw Kibaki dashing back toward patriarchal conclusions.

Rawlings and Atta Mills? Object lessons on how Old Leadership and New Leadership clash with each other. Dictatorial Rawlings wants members of the opposition National Patriotic Party arbitrarily arrested for suspicion of being corrupt. With enormous pressure from Rawlings, Mills reveals how fragile the New Leadership could be, how it could be menaced by Old Leadership. Rawlings sticking to Old Leadership despite the fact that its time is gone has become a dilemma for Mills. The trouble is there is no New Leadership for Rawlings to migrate to. Maybe never.

Either in the analysis of Kufour’s African leadership impasse or Botswana’s and Mauritius’s ability to mix modern leadership practices with their traditional ones that has paid off remarkably, the Ghanaian Joseph William Addai argues in Reforming Leadership in Africa that transformations in African leadership, as a way of improving the quality of governance, should start from African traditional values and then mixed with global governance practices. This means African leaders should have a high sense of African traditional leadership values in relation to global governance ideals.

In this sense, Africa’s leadership struggles are rationalized from within Africa’s soul. It is a new intellectual construct to make things work. A way of thinking about change. For long, Africans have taken their leadership for granted seeing the likes of Bokassa, Doe, and Amin mount power and destroy their countries. The New Leadership is above all struggling toward a working model for the progress mechanisms of The African Century.

Short of this, there will be huge imbalances in the quality of leadership and governance, and this will impact negatively on Africa’s progress. Kenya’s and Nigeria’s struggles for better governance practices, as progress act, seen in their attempts to reform their constitutions, illustrates Africa’s tussles to grapple with its leadership challenges.

Fifty years after freedom from colonial rule, Africa is largely still Old Leadership. But as the flowering of The African Century reveals, Africa’s brilliance would be how it renew itself, how it improvise itself, technically how it quickly grow New Leadership as a replacer of Old Leadership, as part of its transformative endowment. This means New Leadership should be the overarching idea, the signature of The African Century.

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